The Role of Heterogeneous Parameters for the Detection of Selection in Insurance Contracts by Rickayzen, B. D. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Rickayzen, B. D. ORCID: 0000-0002-0433-0870, Klohn, F. and Karlsson, M. 
(2018). The Role of Heterogeneous Parameters for the Detection of Selection in Insurance 
Contracts. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, doi: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.08.002 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/20652/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.08.002
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
The Role of Heterogeneous Parameters for the Detection of
Selection in Insurance Contracts
Martin Karlsson† Florian Klohn‡ Ben Rickayzen§
September 6, 2018
†CINCH, University of Duisburg-Essen, and Lund University. E-mail:
martin.karlsson@uni-due.de
‡Corresponding author: GWQ ServicePlus AG, Tersteegenstr. 28, 40474 Du¨sseldorf, phone:
+49211 758498-660, fax: +49211 758498-48, e-mail: florian.klohn@uni-due.de
§City, University of London, Cass Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, EC1Y 8TZ London, e-mail:
b.d.rickayzen@city.ac.uk
∗We would like to thank Martin Fischer, Astrid Kiil, Stefan Pichler, Robert Plumb, David Smith,
Christoph Strupat, anonymous reviewers and participants of different events for helpful comments:
the 2011 DIBOGS Workshop, the European Conference on Health Economics (2012), the Health
Economics Seminar at the University Duisburg-Essen. All views expressed in this article should be
considered those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the position of the GWQ
ServicePlus AG.
Abstract
This study re-examines standard econometric approaches for detecting adverse and
advantageous selection in insurance contracts based on variables that are not used
for calculating the insurance premium. We formally demonstrate that existing
strategies for detecting selection based on such ‘unused characteristics’ can lead to
incorrect conclusions if the estimated coefficients of interest are driven by different
parts of the population. We show that this issue can empirically be accounted for by
allowing for heterogeneous parameters. We compare existing approaches by using
simulated data with different selection regimes and test for parameter heterogeneity
within the data. We further provide empirical evidence about selection into the
market for private health insurance in England. Both our simulations, and the
findings using real data, suggest that parameter heterogeneity is a relevant issue that
can confound the interpretation of standard ‘unused characteristics’ approaches.
Our findings are important for analysing the efficiency of insurance markets. They
are of interest to both the insurance industry and policymakers, and should be
accounted for when selection based on specific characteristics needs to be detected
or the effects of structural changes of insurance policies/markets are to be predicted.
Keywords: Insurance Markets; Information Asymmetries; Selection; Applied
Econometrics
JEL classification: C18; G22; I13
1 Introduction
There has been a preponderance of theoretical and empirical research in the area of
selection based on information asymmetries ever since Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) wrote their respective seminal works on information asymmetries
and market efficiency. Contemporary economic literature suggests that both ad-
verse and advantageous selection in insurance plans can induce inefficiencies (e.g.
De Meza and Webb, 2001; Einav et al., 2010) and that they depend on the actual
circumstances, e.g. the kind of market at hand and the institutional arrangements
involved (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010). However, in order to discuss implications for
welfare in a specific market a proper empirical detection of selection in the first place
is key, and this is what our paper is emphasizing. From a policy perspective this is
of tremendous importance both for judging the actual performance of an insurance
market, and also in terms of predicting outcomes, when new policies (e.g. regulation
of the contracting of health services) are planned for implementation.
Since the seminal contribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which represents
the classical case of pure adverse selection, other types of selection have received at-
tention in the literature. The most prominent of the latter is advantageous selection,1
which entails a situation where low-risk customers purchase more insurance cover-
age because risk is negatively correlated with some other characteristic that is not
used for pricing (e.g. risk aversion) but which determines demand for insurance
(Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Fang et al., 2008; Buchmueller et al., 2013).
It has been shown that adverse selection can appear in a range of different mar-
ket settings, whereas advantageous selection driven by asymmetric information is
typically not compatible with competitive markets, since no separating equilibrium
is possible under such circumstances (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2013). If there are
sufficiently high administrative costs, however, a negative coverage-risk correlation
driven by multidimensional private information is possible even in a perfectly com-
petitive insurance market (Fang and Wu, 2018). The methodological contribution
1In long-term contracts, selection effects can also arise due to one-sided commitment and learning
(Hendel and Lizzeri, 2003).
1
made in this paper is relevant in any setting where standard testing procedures are
used to detect sources of selection, regardless of the actual mechanism giving rise to
selection effects.
The empirical strategies on selection which are discussed in this paper (e.g.
Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Fang et al., 2008) are usually applied to indirectly
derive evidence about asymmetric information, i.e. coefficients are interpreted as
indicating asymmetric information, depending also on the market structure at hand.
Furthermore, they do not allow us to distinguish between adverse selection and
moral hazard (e.g. Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014; Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014),
although this distinction is beyond the scope of this study. Our contribution is
mainly a technical one, discussing whether the findings of empirical methods that
apply variables which are not used by insurance companies for underwriting pur-
poses can be used to test if such a variable is affecting the risk pool in a positive
or negative way. Bearing this in mind, we use the term ‘selection’ throughout the
paper. Furthermore, we use the term ‘selection’ from the perspective of an expected
loss/benefit of the insurance company, i.e. we actually mean adverse or advantageous
selection.
The early empirical literature (e.g. Chiappori and Salanie´, 1997; Chiappori and
Salanie, 2000) was, in particular, concerned with finding evidence of information
asymmetry based on the prediction that private information will lead to a positive
correlation between risk and insurance coverage. This analysis is typically done
by means of a ‘positive correlation test’, which shows how an individual’s insurance
coverage and ex post risk are correlated after all individual characteristics used in the
pricing of contracts have been partialled out. Such tests can indeed carry information
regarding the relevance of information asymmetries in the aggregate. However, when
there are several types or sources of selection, their usefulness for understanding
individual behaviour and the functioning of the market becomes quite limited. The
very mixed evidence that comes out of this early literature suggests that a more
detailed analysis is required. For example, the evidence in the market for health
insurance seems to be strongly heterogeneous. Looking at studies which focus on
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different insurance markets, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) find evidence for both the
existence of asymmetric information and market efficiency.
During the last decade a large volume of literature has emerged which deals with
these issues by considering the specific origins of selection in insurance markets (e.g.
Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Fang et al., 2008). The underlying rationale is that
there can be different types of selection which may cancel out in the aggregate. The
strategy typically used is to study variables which we refer to as ‘unused character-
istics’ in the rest of this paper, i.e. variables that are not used in the calculation of
the insurance premium by an insurance company, but which are available as obser-
vations for an empirical analysis. Such unused characteristics may either be private
information, and thus unobserved by the insurance company, or ‘unused observables’
– i.e. variables that are known to the insurance company but are not used for pricing
purposes (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014; Kesternich and Schumacher, 2014). From
a methodological point of view, the two types of unused information are equivalent,
but the policy implications can be very different since ‘unused observables’ could be
used in pricing and thus could potentially improve market efficiency.
The ability to attribute selection in insurance markets to specific variables is of
high theoretical and empirical importance, in particular when the evidence regarding
the overall direction of selection is unclear or conflicting. This approach has been
fruitfully applied by several studies that used different markers for selection in in-
surance markets. Examples of such sources of selection include a variety of factors
such as preferences (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cutler et al., 2008; Bauer et al.,
2017), cognitive abilities (Fang et al., 2008), variables that reflect the economic sit-
uation, such as financial wealth or education (Bolhaar et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2009;
Buchmueller et al., 2013; Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014) and place of residence
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014; Bauer et al., 2017).
Despite the aforementioned intense and ongoing usage of such ‘unused charac-
teristics’ approaches regarding sources of selection, no systematic assessment of the
properties of the tests has taken place to date. This is quite remarkable considering
that the identification of sources of selection has been used to draw strong conclu-
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sions regarding both individual behaviour and the functioning of insurance markets.
Therefore, one of the main contributions of this paper is to evaluate, both theoret-
ically and empirically, the impact of parameter heterogeneity on the properties of
testing approaches which use ‘unused characteristics’ to identify selection into insur-
ance markets. Parameter heterogeneity is present whenever such a characteristic has
a different impact on the key dependent variables (typically risk type and insurance
coverage) for different individuals. For example, the unused characteristic could be
an important determinant of health only for a specific part of the population, and
an important determinant of insurance coverage for a completely different part of
the population. In such a scenario, the standard testing procedures would suggest
that the unused characteristic is a source of selection, even though it is not. Us-
ing a simulation exercise where we are able to control the relationships between the
key variables, we show that this is more than a theoretical possibility and actually
quantitatively relevant in many plausible settings.
In addition, parameter heterogeneity is a real and relevant challenge given the
growing literature documenting heterogeneity in the effects of various determinants
of health such as time availability (Eibich, 2015; Berniell and Bietenbeck, 2017);
wealth (Cesarini et al., 2016); public health interventions (Bhalotra et al., 2017);
and lifestyles (Felfe et al., 2016). A large literature in medicine on gene-environment
interactions delivers a further rationale for why we should expect environmental de-
terminants of health to be heterogeneous in their impact. This does indeed appear to
be the case e.g. regarding the effect of diet on obesity (Qi et al., 2014) or the effects
of various lifestyle factors on the risk of multiple sclerosis (Olsson et al., 2017). There
are also reasons to expect that the impact of unused characteristics on the demand
for insurance is heterogeneous. For example, Brown et al. (2016) find substantial
heterogeneity in the state-dependence of utility. In general, people tend to value
consumption in the healthy state more; however, this tends to vary with the type
of health shocks considered. In addition, there is substantial heterogeneity between
individuals in their valuation of consumption in the unhealthy state, and this het-
erogeneity is largely orthogonal to personal characteristics. It follows that any such
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personal characteristic which predicts demand for insurance will be heterogeneous
in its impact.
In this paper, to further illustrate the interplay between heterogeneity and unused
characteristics, we consider the variable “time availability” in the context of private
health insurance in England. We might ask, for example, what role heterogeneity
may play when considering time availability as a determinant of selection into private
health insurance? It could well be the case that some very impatient individuals
increase their likelihood of purchasing health insurance (e.g. if they want to reduce
waiting times), whereas impatience in other cases might reduce the same likelihood
(e.g. if it leads to less forward-looking behaviour and lower demand for health
insurance). Hence, it is easy to see how heterogeneity may play an important role in
the interpretation of ‘unused characteristics’ approaches. Therefore, it is important
to compare the outcomes of these approaches in detecting selection in the real world.
As a result, we use individual level panel data from England in order to assess
whether the ‘unused characteristic’ availability of time is a determinant of selection
into the private English health insurance market, allowing for heterogeneity at the
individual level.
The aims of this paper are threefold: Firstly, the main contribution of this study
is a technical one. We formally demonstrate that standard ‘unused characteris-
tics’ approaches which allow the detection of selection due to specific characteristics
can lead to the wrong conclusions being made. Secondly, we create artificial data
to emphasize this issue allowing for different correlation structures that reflect se-
lection effects into the insurance market. We use a multilevel model to take this
phenomenon into account, allowing for individual parameter heterogeneity in our
estimates. Thirdly, we provide further empirical evidence, using the ‘availability of
time’ as a potential source of risk-based selection into the market for private health
insurance, using longitudinal data for the English population over the age of 50.
In the next section we provide a literature overview with an emphasis on com-
monly used tests which empirically identify information asymmetries and selection
in insurance markets. Following this, we show first theoretically, and then by sim-
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ulation, that under specific circumstances tests based on two equations which are
often applied to detect information asymmetries with ‘unused characteristics’ can
give misleading results. We then give a brief overview of the institutional framework
in the English health care system and provide additional empirical evidence on se-
lection and parameter heterogeneity in the market for private health insurance in
England using the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA). After discussing
our findings we draw conclusions and make suggestions for future research in this
field.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 The Detection of Selection in Insurance Markets
Our starting point will be the ‘positive correlation test’, originally developed by Chi-
appori and Salanie´ (1997). Formally the approach can be described by the following
equations,
I = Xφ+  (1)
R = Xψ + η (2)
where I is an indicator for insurance status and R is an indicator for being at risk,
while X is a matrix containing variables which an insurance company uses for cal-
culating the insurance premium. The vectors φ and ψ contain parameters to be
estimated and  and η reflect error terms of the equations. Under the null hypoth-
esis of no asymmetric information, the residuals  and η should be uncorrelated.
Conversely, a significant correlation between the two is indicative of asymmetric
information.
Subsequent literature assesses the issue of multiple dimensions of private informa-
tion in the context of detecting selection. As Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) argue,
the correlation of error terms in the ‘Chiappori approach’ is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for the existence of information asymmetries about the risk type.
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The authors suggest that misleading results may arise if several characteristics have
an impact on both dependent variables (some negatively, some positively), and that,
overall, the effects cancel each other out on average. For example, in addition to
an individual’s risk class, the risk preference heterogeneity of the consumers might
offset the correlation of the two equations’ error terms. The authors state that if an
econometrician can observe such relevant information, and this information is not
used for pricing by the insurer, then the inclusion of these variables as additional
explanatory variables into equations (1) and (2) will make it possible to detect and
separate out the particular source of selection. This approach, which we are calling
an ‘unused characteristics’ approach, is based on the equations
I = Xφ+ Zδ +  (3)
R = Xψ + Zβ + η (4)
where Z represents a matrix containing additional information about the insured
which is not used for pricing. The condition for attributing selection would in this
case be that any new variable being included in the model has an impact both on
insurance probability and of ‘being at risk’. In their study, Finkelstein and McGarry
are able to use information that is assumed to be unknown to the insurer in the
market for long term care (LTC) in the US. As mentioned above, the test can also
be applied to characteristics which are observable but not used in pricing (Finkelstein
and Poterba, 2014).
Fang et al. (2008) develop a similar approach in order to reveal ‘unused charac-
teristics’ that drive selection in insurance markets. Assuming ‘used observables’ are
already partialled out, their approach is based on the regression model:
I = α1 + α2R+ ν (5)
followed by a regression where an ‘unobserved’ variable z is included:
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I = γ1 + γ2R+ γ3z + µ. (6)
It follows directly from the formula of omitted variable bias that the OLS estimator
αˆ2 has expectation E (αˆ2 | R) = γ2 + γ3 (R′R)−1 E [R′z | R] = γ2 + γ3βˆ, where βˆ in
the second term is the OLS coefficient of z when regressed on R. The detection of
selection is based on the difference between the estimates of α2 and γ2. Hence, the
‘detected’ source of selection induced by z is defined as E(αˆ2)−E(γˆ2) = γ2+γ3βˆ−γ2 =
γ3βˆ. In the case of detected advantageous selection driven by z this difference will be
negative i.e. (γ2 > α2) if γ3 < 0 and z is positively partially correlated with R. As
compared to the approach suggested by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), evidence is
not based directly on the comparison of how z associates with two different outcomes,
but on one coefficient and the partial correlation of z and R.
2.2 Introducing Heterogeneity
So far, we have followed the convention in the literature of assuming parameter
homogeneity, i.e. that the ‘unused characteristics’ have the same relationship with
R and I in all parts of the population. In the light of the abundance of evidence
suggesting that heterogeneity is a relevant phenomenon for many health risks, we
now consider the consequences of relaxing the homogeneity assumption. In order
to simplify the notation, we now suppress the used observables X in all equations.
All derivations that follow are thus implicitly conditional on X. This leads to the
simplified system of equations
Ii = δizi + i (7)
Ri = βizi + ηi (8)
where heterogeneity is captured by the individual-specific coefficients (δi, βi) with
means (µδ, µβ). If the system is identified – which requires Cov (zi, βi) =
Cov (zi, δi) = 0 – and imposing homogeneity, the OLS estimators δˆ and βˆ would
provide unbiased and consistent estimates of the population parameters µδ and µβ.
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A finding that δˆ > 0 and βˆ > 0 would be interpreted as evidence of adverse selection.
In order to assess the consequences of heterogeneity, we impose the assumptions
that µδ > 0 and µβ > 0 so that we expect the test based on unused characteristics
to suggest adverse selection. The critical issue is whether these assumptions imply
E(Ri) ≥ E(Ri|Ii > 0) also in the presence of heterogeneity. In order to assess
whether this is the case, consider the average risk of the insured subpopulation, i.e.
individuals who satisfy the restriction δizi + i > 0:
E(Ri|Ii > 0) = E(βizi|δizi > −i) (9)
Given the population means µβ and E(zi) = µz, the degree of adverse selection may
be written as
E(βizi|δizi > −i)− E(Ri) =µβ × E(zi − µz|δizi > −i) (10)
+ µz × E(βi − µβ|δizi > −i)
+ E((βi − µβ)(zi − µz)|δizi > −i).
The first and second term in (10) are positive due to our assumptions. Hence,
E(Ri) ≥ E(Ri|Ii > 0) can be true if E(βi − µβ|δizi > −i) < 0 or E((βi −
µβ)(zi − µz)|δizi > −i) < 0. Therefore, we would need Cov (βi, δi) < 0 and thus
E(βi|δizi > −i) < µβ to allow for an offsetting of the other terms in the decomposi-
tion. Concerning a situation with µβ < 0 and µδ > 0 (or vice versa), so that the test
suggests advantageous selection, the true selection may be adverse if Cov (βi, δi) > 0.
Next, we consider whether parameter heterogeneity is a problem with the ap-
proach suggested by Fang et al. (2008). The estimate for E (αˆ2 | R) remains un-
changed in this scenario. However, an estimate based on equation (6) – which
imposes parameter homogeneity on γ3, the coefficient associated with the unused
variable, will deliver a biased estimate of γ2, the coefficient associated with the
risk variable R. This can be shown as follows: specification (6) is equivalent
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to a model where Ii is regressed on R˜i = Ri − µβzi = (βi − µβ) zi + ηi (An-
grist and Pischke, 2008). The resulting parameter has expectation E (γˆ2 | R) =
γ2 + E
[
Var (zi) Cov (γ3i, βi) /Var
(
R˜
)
| R˜
]
. The intuition here is that when we
regress R on z in order to partial out that variable, we do it without taking hetero-
geneity into account, and for this reason R˜i still includes a component of individual
heterogeneity related to z. Hence, whenever the parameters are correlated, the test
for selection will deliver biased results.
3 Empirical Implementation
In the previous section we have shown that parameter heterogeneity at the indi-
vidual level (δi, βi) may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding selection into health
insurance. We now turn to an empirical assessment of this claim, first using evidence
based on simulated data, and then real-world data regarding the market for private
health insurance in England.
3.1 Econometric Model
Throughout the empirical analysis, we compare and contrast results coming out of
three different methods. We complement the two standard approaches discussed
above (Fang et al., 2008; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) with a method that allows
for heterogeneity in the parameters associated with the unused observable z. This
third approach relies on panel data and is implemented as a multilevel model with
random coeffcients (called the ‘RC Model’ henceforth; cf. Hsiao, 2014). The two
estimating equations used in this part are
Iit = δizit +Xitφ+ it (11)
Rit = βizit +Xitψ + νit (12)
where Iit and Rit represent insurance demand and risk of individual i in period
t, and zit is the unused observable. The vector Xit includes all observable char-
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acteristics which may be used for calculating the insurance premium. In order
to asses whether conclusions based on the standard approaches can be mislead-
ing due to parameter heterogeneity, a critical statistic will be our estimate of
E (βiδi) = Cov(βi, δi) +E(βi)E(δi). This statistic follows directly from the decompo-
sition of covariance discussed in section 2.2 and measures by how much the risk pool
of insured individuals changes when z is increased by one unit – in other words, it
measures the degree and direction of selection attributable to z.
In our comparative analysis we apply both ‘unused characteristics’ approaches
by pooling the data in order to compare their results. When applying the approach
suggested by Fang et al. (2008), where 2 equations are subsequently estimated, we
derive the direction and degree of selection based on the difference in the partial
correlation of I and R before and after an ‘unused characteristic’ is included in the
specification.
3.2 Evidence by Simulation
For our simulation analysis, panel data with 1,000 cross-sectional observations and 5
time-series units were generated under different assumptions regarding the distribu-
tion of the parameters δi and βi, as well as other variables in the analysis. Assuming
that other information X used for calculating the insurance premium is already par-
tialled out before estimation, the simulations are based on the following structural
equations, where i refers to an individual and t to the time unit.
Iit = δizit + it (13)
Rit = βizit + ηit (14)
zit, it and ηit are standard normal random variables whereas δi and βi are fixed
individual-level parameters that vary randomly between individuals and simulations.
The population means, standard deviations and the degree of correlation between
the parameters δi and βi vary between different scenarios. We consider eight distinct
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scenarios and run 100 simulations for each one. The main results are presented in
Table 1. Since our focus is on the properties of the tests considered, we only present
evidence regarding their performance, and do not report the parameter estimates
coming out of the regressions.
Table 1: Simulation Results
Simulation Parameters Empirical Evaluation
FMcG FKS RC Model
No. µβ µδ σβ σδ ρ (βi, δi) ρ (e1, e2) E [βi, δi] TPn TP FP TPn TP FP TPn TP FP
1 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.30 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 . . 0.00 . . 0.06
3 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.00
5 0.30 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.00
6 0.30 0.20 1.00 1.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.86 0.00
7 0.30 0.20 1.00 1.00 -0.60 0.00 -0.56 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.00
8 0.30 0.20 1.00 1.00 -0.60 -0.20 -0.56 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.00
Notes: The seven leftmost columns present the parameters used in the simulations, where β is the
parameter associating the ‘unused observable’ z with health risk, and δ associates z with insurance
coverage. We denote the correlation coefficient by ρ (·, ·). For three test procedures – based on
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Fang et al. (2008) and a random coefficients model, respectively
– three statistics are presented as a fraction of 100 simulations: TPn is the fraction of cases
correctly identifying the sign of the selection related to z, TP is the corresponding fraction that
also attains statistical significance, and FP represents the fraction of cases where the suggested
direction of selection is wrong and statistically significant.
The left side of the table (the first 7 columns) contains the assumptions under-
lying each run of simulations, whereas the right side shows the performance of the
different tests. For each test, we present three different statistics: TPn (where TP
stands for true positive) counts the fraction of simulations where the conclusion of
the test – without considering statistical significance – corresponds to the actual se-
lection imposed by z. It follows that the corresponding error rate (which we will refer
to as ‘false positives’ for convenience) equals 1−TPn, and hence it is not reported in
the table. For example, if the scenario imposes adverse selection and the estimates
βˆ > 0 and δˆ > 0, then the Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) approach concludes
that there is adverse selection, which would be a true positive. The statistic TP in
the following column requires in addition that both estimates are significantly differ-
ent from zero. Finally, FP measures the rate of ‘false positives’, representing cases
where the tests would reach the wrong conclusion and would do so with statistical
12
significance.
Our first three sets of simulations show what happens if selection is ‘hidden’ in the
sense that it is completely driven by parameter heterogeneity and Cov (βi, δi) 6= 0
– whereas the average effect of z on R and I equals zero. In scenario 1, there is
advantageous selection: individuals who face a reduced risk due to z (βi < 0) are
also more likely to purchase insurance (δi > 0) on average. In this case, measured
by the TPn criterion, neither the Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) approach nor
the Fang et al. (2008) approach is much better than chance, with a success rate
of 0.56 and 0.52 respectively. If in addition we require statistical significance, the
success rate of both equals zero. A multilevel estimation procedure, which allows for
parameter heterogeneity, performs much better and identifies advantageous selection
in 100 cases out of 100.
Scenario 2 assumes that there is no selection related to z. In this case there
are, of course, no ‘true positives’ but on the other hand, ‘false positives’ represent a
possibility. The Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang et al. (2008) procedures
do not have any such false positives, and the RC model has a false positive rate of six
per cent. In scenario 3 we increase the degree of selection (the number of ‘positives’)
and set Cov (βi, δi) > 0 (adverse selection). The approaches of Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) and Fang et al. (2008) are slightly better at identifying selection if
measured by counts (TPn) as compared to scenario 1 (66 per cent as compared to
56 per cent, and 61 per cent as compared to 52 per cent, respectively). However,
these ‘true positives’ do not hold in terms of statistical signficance (as demonstrated
by the TP columns) whereas the RC model also detects selection if we consider
statistical significance. Scenario 4 changes the variance of parameter heterogeneity,
keeping Cov (βi, δi) identical to scenario 3. These changes do not affect the degree of
selection attributable to z, but they decrease the performance of all test procedures.
From scenario 5 onwards, we allow the average effects of z on R and I to be
different from zero. This has a great impact on the results of the three test pro-
cedures. Scenario 5 represents a case where there is adverse selection related to z
(E [βiδi] = 0.06) and no parameter heterogeneity. In this case, the standard ‘un-
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used characteristics’ procedures correctly identify the direction of selection, but the
approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) performs in a superior way when we
consider statistical significance as compared to the other approaches. In scenarios
6–8 we combine adverse selection in the average effects and allow for parameter het-
erogeneity in the opposite direction. For example, in scenario 6, Cov (βi, δi) = −0.3
clearly dominates E(βi)E(δi) = 0.06 in the term E (βi, δi) = −0.24 Here, the per-
formance of the standard ‘unused characteristics’ procedures is strikingly poor as
there are no ‘true positives’. Moreover, the Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) proce-
dure more often leads to a detection of statistically significant selection in the wrong
direction as compared to Fang et al. (2008). The performance of the RC model
improves if parameter heterogeneity becomes larger as shown in Scenario 7. In these
scenarios, both standard test procedures are clearly dominated by the RC model
which identifies the true direction of selection almost perfectly. The superiority of
the RC approach is revealed in scenario 8 as well, where the error terms of the equa-
tions (13) and (14) are negatively correlated. Such a correlation can reflect the role
of additional characteristics in the association of risk and insurance status and it
also plays a role in the market for private health insurance in England, as discussed
in 3.3. below.
In summary, our simulation analysis shows that both the standard testing ap-
proaches considered here will perform poorly when there is parameter heterogeneity
which works in the opposite direction to that of the unused observable z on average.
We have also seen that the RC model dominates the other two approaches under a
wide range of assumptions. On the other hand, assuming heterogeneity at the indi-
vidual level, the RC model requires that either panel data are available or that the
parameter heterogeneity can be attributed to some other observable characteristic.
Moreover, the RC model tends to have a greater number of false positives than the
other two approaches.
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3.3 The Market for Private Health Insurance in England
Our simulation analysis above has shown that parameter heterogeneity may inval-
idate some standard tests used to detect sources of selection. We now turn to an
empirical application on real-world data in order to assess whether this theoretical
possibility is also of practical relevance. Before conducting the analysis we provide
some background information on the market for private health insurance in England.
3.3.1 Institutional Background in England
The population of England is entitled to free healthcare, and this is provided by
the National Health Service (NHS) through primary care (general practice) and
secondary care (hospital based care given through both NHS and Foundation Trusts).
The main principle of the NHS is to make health services available to every citizen
who is in need.2 However, in practice, there are a number of treatments which are not
available within the system. Most of the latter are excluded because they are viewed
as being non-essential, but some are excluded for financial reasons.3 In addition to
the public provision of healthcare via the NHS, individuals can choose to top up their
provision through the purchase of private health insurance. This might be done on
an individual basis or as part of the benefits package offered by an employer (Boyle,
2011). Private insurance covers services which duplicate those of the NHS (Kiil,
2012) but also provides cover for enhanced services such as faster access and a wider
consumer choice, compared to that which is offered by the NHS. Insurers can freely
determine the services they offer, but most packages cover surgery as an inpatient
or day case, hospital accommodation, nursing care and inpatient tests. Individual
contracts tend to be renewable on an annual basis. Insurance companies mainly use
medical underwriting and age as information for calculating the risk premium but
other variables such as sex, smoking and occupational status may be used. Based
on medical underwriting, certain conditions can be excluded from cover; however a
policy will typically be offered also in these cases (Boyle, 2011; Association of British
2http://www.nhshistory.net/a guide to the nhs.htm
3http://www.londonhealth.co.uk/nhs/index.html
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Insurers, 2012).
While there is very little regulation in the English market for private health in-
surance concerning the pricing of the products, and the products themselves, the
UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority
(PRA) regulate health insurers in areas such as capital adequacy, consumer welfare
and product sales (Karl, 2014). There is a lack of research on the competitiveness of
the English market, but there are several reasons to believe it is relatively competi-
tive. First, even though the market is relatively concentrated, no insurer dominates
the market; the four largest insurers (BUPA with a market share of 42%; AXA PPP,
Norwich Union and Standard Life) had a joint market share of 83.5 per cent in 2006.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 0.25 which these numbers imply, is well below
the pre-ACA level of concentration in the U.S. at 0.41 (Boyle, 2011; Dafny et al.,
2015). Second, the market power of insurers is limited by the existence of close sub-
stitutes such as the NHS and self-funded employer plans (Markar and O’Sullivan,
2012). Third, at around 25 per cent, the premium loading factors were at the lower
end of estimated ranges of 25-40 per cent for the individual market in the U.S. (Boyle,
2011; Newhouse, 2004; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). This is again indicative of a
somewhat larger competitive pressure than is experienced in, for example, the US.4
There is little evidence of selection in the market for private health insurance in
England. Propper et al. (2001) analyse the dynamics in the demand for private health
insurance (PHI) between 1978 and 1996 in the UK, using the Family Expenditure
Survey. Controlling for consumer characteristics and health service quality measures,
they find that the availability of private healthcare facilities and cohort effects, which
might indicate changes in tastes/attitude to PHI, are important factors in deciding
whether PHI is purchased.
Wallis (2004) also looks for the determinants of demand for PHI in the UK,
based on British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data. The author evaluates the
switching behaviour of individuals and focuses both on characteristics influencing the
4Finally, confirmation that the UK market is competitive comes from a senior pricing actuary
working in the health insurance market (Cheung, 2018).
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probability of purchasing insurance and the individual cost of PHI (i.e. the insurance
premium). He differentiates between the demand side characteristics of consumers
and the supply side aspects that can influence insurance status, e.g. quality of
service.
A more recent study, which uses the BHPS data, is done by Olivella and Vera-
Herna´ndez (2013), who focus on adverse selection in the market for PHI, using
hospitalisation as a measure for being at risk. As Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez
(2013) both theoretically and empirically show there is, overall, a positive correla-
tion between health risk and private health insurance status in England. Assuming
that the health status of an individual is independent of receiving PHI as a fringe
employment benefit, their results suggest the existence of adverse selection in the
PHI market in England. Their findings suggest that this selection may be partly
explained by preferences for health (care).
3.3.2 ELSA Data
Our empirical illustration of parameter heterogeneity and selection in insurance plans
is based on ELSA, which is a representative individual level dataset for England’s
age 50+ population. The ELSA dataset contains a broad range of information on
each individual’s health and financial circumstances, together with the overall de-
mographics, which makes it an ideal source to model both economic decisions and
health-related characteristics.
For our analysis we use both the cross-sectional and longitudinal dimension of
the ELSA survey so that the period we are using captures the time from year 2002
to 2013. We restrict the data to individuals aged 90 or younger since we cannot
identify the actual age of people over age 90. Furthermore, in respect of the longi-
tudinal nature of our dataset, we account for attrition and make the sample we use
representative for the first wave by applying the sample weights provided with the
ELSA data.
As our main dependent variable, we use self-assessed health (SAH) as a measure
for being at risk. This is a widely used indicator, also in the literature on selection in
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health insurance (Doiron et al., 2008; Bolin et al., 2010), with well-known pros and
cons. The main strengths of this indicator for our purposes are that it has exceptional
predictive validity regarding some dimensions of health, such as mortality (Idler and
Benyamini, 1997; Benyamini and Idler, 1999; DeSalvo et al., 2006) and it captures not
only observable information but also information that can affect future demand for
health care which cannot be accounted for from using only observable and objective
health data. In addition, recent research has shown that the validity of this indicator
has increased over time (Schnittker and Bacak, 2014).
On the other hand, there are concerns that SAH is prone to measurement error
due to inter alia subjective biases in the perception of health. A related issue is
that it appears to capture some dimensions of health better than others: alongside
mortality, additional aspects such as vitality, mobility and pain are closely related
to SAH whereas mental health and social functioning tend to get much less weight
(Au and Johnston, 2014). It has also been shown that SAH reflects serious chronic
conditions better than less severe conditions (Doiron et al., 2015). Doiron et al.
(2015) also show that the relationship between SAH and health care utilisation
weakens considerably when conditioned on some objective indicators of health. In
order to mitigate the concerns we conduct a robustness check to see if our results
are robust to changes in the health indicator used.
ELSA provides the commonly used 5-point scale for Self-Assessed-Health (SAH)
which we collapse into binary variables that we call ‘High Risk’ (HR) and ‘Low Risk’
(see descriptive statistics in Table 2). The variable HR captures being in ‘fair’ or
‘poor’ health status as compared to ‘excellent’, ‘very good’ and ‘good’ (i.e. low risk).
The variable HR is used in our analysis to capture information when an individual
poses a relatively high health risk from the perspective of an insurance company.
The second main dependent variable is a dummy variable (PHI) which equals 1 if
someone has private health insurance and 0 otherwise.
We exclude people from the analysis who have PHI cover only as part of the
employee benefits package being offered by their employer. This is because the way
in which such group cover is purchased by an employer, and the way in which it is
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PHI 0.126 0.331 0 1 31492
HR 0.266 0.442 0 1 31492
time avail 0.774 0.418 0 1 31492
female 0.565 0.496 0 1 31492
age 67.633 8.959 50 89 31492
couple 0.690 0.463 0 1 31492
children 0.883 0.322 0 1 31492
retired 0.599 0.49 0 1 31492
unemployed 0.112 0.316 0 1 31492
managerial 0.095 0.293 0 1 31492
intermediate 0.037 0.19 0 1 31492
small employer 0.049 0.217 0 1 31492
lower supervisory 0.024 0.154 0 1 31492
semi-routine 0.083 0.276 0 1 31492
smoke now 0.129 0.335 0 1 31492
smoke past 0.5 0.5 0 1 31492
CHH: excellent 0.332 0.471 0 1 27900
CHH: very good 0.334 0.472 0 1 27900
CHH: good 0.208 0.406 0 1 27900
CHH: fair 0.086 0.281 0 1 27900
CHH: poor 0.034 0.181 0 1 27900
CHH: varied a lot 0.006 0.076 0 1 27900
Notes: Information about variable definitions is provided in Appendix A1.
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priced, are both very different from the approach which is adopted for individual
policies. Therefore, the two groups may not be regarded as being similar in our sta-
tistical analysis. As previously mentioned, it is important for our analysis that the
econometric model contains all the relevant information used by an insurance com-
pany in order to calculate the insurance premium. Our initial selection of variables
included all variables used by Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez (2013) which are also
available in the ELSA data, but since our analysis only includes individual policies,
some variables could be excluded – in particular variables capturing whether the PHI
coverage is provided by an employer. Hence, we condition on the following variables
that may used by insurance companies: age, sex, smoking (history), employment
status (retired, unemployed or category of National Statistics Socioeconomic Classi-
fication), occupation, family status (indicator for being married or cohabiting), and
whether the person has children. The last two variables are included since health
insurance policies can also include the whole family of a policy holder.5 We further
use dummy variables for the local authority region in which the respondent is living,
information that is given to an insurance company when buying a policy. From the
perspective of an insurance company this variable is important since health status
is known to vary strongly between different English regions (Newton et al., 2015).
Wave 3 of ELSA provides information about the individual’s self-assessed health
status during childhood. We use this variable in order to partially account for an
individual’s health history. This is important since insurers may use the past and
present health status as factors to take into account when calculating a policy holder’s
premium (Boyle, 2011). Although self-assessed childhood health is probably not
fully able to capture all the health risks of an individual which are available to the
insurance company when underwriting, there is a growing literature emphasizing the
importance of early child health on health outcomes much later in life (e.g. Blackwell
et al., 2001; Delaney and Smith, 2012; Hamad et al., 2016; Bhalotra et al., 2017).
Hence, we generate 6 indicator variables in order to capture variation in initial health
status – see Appendix A1.
5https://boughtbymany.com/news/article/private-health-insurance-cost-uk/#factors
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As regards the ‘unused characteristic’, we have to choose a variable from the
literature which is likely to drive selection within the private health insurance mar-
ket but cannot directly be assessed by an insurance company and is therefore not
available for calculating a policyholder’s premium. Furthermore, the variable should
be available across several waves since we follow a panel-data approach – and, in
particular, we should expect it to have a heterogeneous impact on risk and on the
propensity to purchase private health insurance. A variable in our data which does
meet these criteria is “availability of time”.
From a health economics perspective, restrictions in time availability are of great
interest since the decision to take out private health insurance in the UK is known
to depend on waiting times for health care (e.g. King and Mossialos, 2005; Johar
et al., 2013). As the waiting times in the English market for health care are usually
much shorter with private health insurance than with the NHS, a patient’s views on
the waiting time and the corresponding opportunity costs will determine whether an
individual takes out private insurance or not. If a patient is willing and able to wait
longer for treatment then there is less incentive to opt into the PHI market. This is
also in line with Buchmueller et al. (2013) who suggest that the high opportunity cost
of time may explain a part of the advantageous selection in the Australian private
health insurance market.
Concerning health, there is a rich literature documenting a positive relationship
between time availability and health. Grossman’s seminal model, where time is an
input into the health production process, provides a theoretical rationale (Gross-
man, 1972): health production requires not only material resources but also time.
Subsequent empirical work has confirmed that goods and time are complements in
the production of health (Du and Yagihashi, 2017a). Various health measures have
also been associated with working hours (Abramowitz, 2016), and in the literature
establishing a negative relationship between the business cycle and health, the avail-
ability of time is one of the most prominent explanation candidates (Ruhm, 2015).
Thus, in general, the economic literature suggests a positive relationship between
time availability and health. There is, however, abundant evidence of heterogeneity
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in the relationship: for example, the effects of retirement on health have been found
to be strongly heterogeneous in Germany (Eibich, 2015) and unemployment is some-
times found to have a detrimental effect on individual health (Urbanos-Garrido and
Lopez-Valcarcel, 2015; Breuer, 2015).
We use the respondent’s answer to the question ‘Do you have enough time to do
everything?’ to capture an individual’s availability of time. The ELSA survey offers
6 different choices to the respondent varying between ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly
disagree’. We collapse it into a binary variable with the aggregate content ‘agree’
(1) and ‘not agree’ (0).
We provide estimates of 4 different specifications. The first specification is used
for comparison purposes and just accounts for age as an additional covariate. The
second specification is our ‘baseline’. We condition on variables that are assumed to
be used for calculating the insurance premium for the PHI contract. For our third
specification, we include time dummies to rule out changes over the time that may
affect our estimates. In our fourth specification, we include the indicator variables
which capture initial health status.
In Appendix A3 and A4 we provide some robustness checks by varying the cut-off
point of our health risk variable and also use a more objective measure for health
risk. One concern with the time availability measure is that it is likely to be related
to income. Indeed, wages have been shown to have an impact on the time people
have available for health-promoting activities (Du and Yagihashi, 2017b). We also
take this possibility into account when controlling for personal income.
3.3.3 Results
Each row in Table 3 provides estimates for a different specification. In row 1 we
present a minimal specification where we assume that only age is used to calculate
the risk premium by health insurance companies. The estimates from our baseline
specification are shown in row 2, whereas time effects and childhood health effects
are accounted for in rows 3 and 4. The columns allow a comparison of the standard
‘unused characteristics’ approaches (columns 1 to 5) and the approach that accounts
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for parameter heterogeneity (columns 6 to 8).
As can be seen in column 3 there is a negative correlation between health risk
and insurance across all specifications, which suggests advantageous selection in the
aggregate. This empirical finding deviates somewhat from that of Olivella and Vera-
Herna´ndez (2013, Table 2), where health and insurance takeup are found to be
unrelated. This is possibly due to our sample being very different in terms of age
and sex. However, as our focus is not on the overall degree of selection, but on
selection associated with a specific variable z, we now consider the interpretation
of ‘unused characteristics’ approaches. Turning to the estimates of our baseline
specification in row 2, the coefficients of the Linear Probability Model (LPM)6 based
on the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) (see columns 1 and 2 in Table
3) show that the availability of time is both negatively associated with someone’s
health risk status (-0.071) and the ownership of private health insurance (-0.018).7
Table 3: Estimates ELSA data
Spec. N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Finkelstein and McGarry Fang et al. RC-Model
Dependent variable HR PHI PHI PHI PHI HR PHI –
Parameter βˆ δˆ αˆ2 αˆ2 − γˆ2 γˆ3 E
(
βˆi
)
E
(
δˆi
)
E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
1–age 31,573 -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.058*** 0.001 -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.004***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) [0.845] (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
2–baseline 31,492 -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.040*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.059*** -0.016*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) [0.810] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
3–time 31,492 -0.070*** -0.018*** -0.040*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.056*** -0.018*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) [0.810] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
4–CHH 27,900 -0.062*** -0.021*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.024*** -0.049*** -0.020*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) [0.816] (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
Notes: The columns of each specification show results of unused characteristics approaches. Estimates resulting in columns 1
to 5 are based on Linear Probability Models. Columns 1 and 2 are estimates from the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) represented by the structural equations (3) and (4), whereas columns 3 to 5 reflect the estimates based on the structural
equations (5) and (6) suggested by Fang et al. (2008). Coefficients of other ‘used characteristics’ are not shown above but
detailed regression results for column 2 can be found in Appendix A2. An F test is used to test whether the coefficient of
R (based on the specification in column 3) equals the coefficient of R after the inclusion of z into the model. Columns 6 to
7 show the coefficients from a multilevel model where the explanatory variable ‘availability of time’ is supposed to have a
random coefficient and the effect of all other variables is supposed to be fixed. Column 8 contains E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
, the degree of
selection associated with z. Standard errors clustered at the individual level; standard errors in (), p-values in []. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The approach suggested by Fang et al. (2008) also indicates that the unused
characteristic z is negatively associated with both risk and insurance. However, the
association between R and I hardly changes when z is controlled for (column 4) and
6Despite theoretical concerns over the interpretation of the coefficients in a LPM (e.g. Wooldridge,
2003), we find that the LPM fits our data well. Its coefficients are, both in terms of economic
relevance and statistical significance, very similar to the marginal effects derived from a probit
model.
7The results for other control variables can be found in the Appendix A2, but are not of interest
for our analysis since we assume that they are used in the calculation of an individual’s insurance
premium.
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the difference is not statistically significant.8 The interpretation of the positive point
estimate in column 4 would be that z is a source of adverse selection, even though
its impact is very small and not statistically significant.
When focusing on the estimates from our RC model, we find that the estimates
of the fixed part of our model (columns 6 and 7) are similar to those obtained
from the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006): z appears to be a source of
adverse selection according to this measure. However, the multilevel model allows
us to account for heterogeneity and calculate E
(
δˆiβˆi
)
; a statistic that measures the
overall degree of selection related to z (column 8). This statistic is negative, which
implies that on average, z is actually a source of advantageous selection – even though
it enters negatively in the risk equation and also in the insurance equation.
In summary, our baseline specification has shown that in the scenario considered
here, the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) would suggest that z is a
source of adverse selection which is endorsed by the approach of Fang et al. (2008)
although here there is not much selection detected that is related to z.
Next, we assess the robustness of the results. The estimates are nearly identical
when we account for time fixed effects in specification 3. Following this, we account
for someone’s health during childhood in specification 4. The number of observations
is considerably lower here, since some respondents of the survey did not answer this
question. Notwithstanding that point, overall the findings are very similar to the
ones in the other specifications 1–3. Here, we also see that the impact of z on private
health insurance is decreasing when childhood health is included which suggests that
an individual’s initial health status is a predictor of the take up of PHI. Nevertheless,
the main relationships identified in the other specifications remain robust. Although
the standard ‘unused characteristics’ approaches suggest adverse selection, there is
a negative correlation between the coefficients of interest which changes the sign of
the selection.
Some additional robustness checks are provided in Appendix A3. First, we vary
8However, the literature usually does not test whether this difference is statistically significant
(e.g. Buchmueller et al., 2013; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014).
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the cut-off in SAH used to generate our health risk variable, now assigning the cate-
gories ‘good’, ‘fair’ and ‘poor’ the value 1. Doing this changes some of the estimates
slightly but not qualitatively. In addition, we turn to a more objective measure of
health risk by using a variable that captures long-standing illnesses instead. This
alternative risk variable takes the value 1 if respondents have a long-standing illness.
Again, the results are very similar to our baseline case overall, even though some of
the precision in the estimates is lost due to the reduced sample size, as this variable
is not available in the first wave of the data. Finally, we check whether our esti-
mates concerning the ‘availability of time’ are to some extent driven by differences
in incomes. The results of these specifications can be found in Appendix A4. As
expected, income affects health risk negatively and insurance status positively (co-
efficients not shown) – but this does not affect our conclusions regarding availability
of time.
Our finding that the ‘unused characteristic’ time availability points into the direc-
tion of advantageous rather then adverse selection (after allowing for heterogeneity)
is supported by Buchmueller et al. (2013) who argue that advantageous selection into
PHI may to some extent be explained by the possibility of avoiding waiting times in
the Australian health care sector.
Can our empirical findings concerning correlated coefficients be explained more
intuitively? As mentioned above, economic theory suggests a negative relationship
between an individual’s availability of time and both their demand for health insur-
ance and health risk. Which role can heterogeneity play here? Although there is
literature on heterogeneity in time preferences concerning health care decisions (e.g.
Grignon, 2009), we do not know the actual mechanism that can explain our empirical
finding. We now present one very simple example that would generate the results
of our preferred specification above. Suppose the population consists of two equally
large groups, denoted 1 and 2 in what follows. In group 1, increased time availability
is associated with a reduction in the demand for insurance (δ1 = −0.036) and a de-
terioration in health risk (β1 = 0.11). We can think of this group as career oriented
individuals who perceive a high opportunity cost of time when working hard, and
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who need to keep in shape in order to meet their job demands. Group 2, on the other
hand, does not change their demand for insurance in response to time availability
(δ2 = 0) but they do invest a lot more in their health when more time is available
(β2 = −0.25). We may think of this group as individuals who perceive time pressure
for other reasons than career demands. With the parameter values suggested in this
example, we would indeed have a situation where E (β) = 12 · 0.11− 12 · 0.25 = −0.07
and E (δ) = −12 · 0.036 + 12 · 0 = −0.018, which leads standard tests to suggest time
availability is a source of adverse selection. However, we also have E (βδ) = −0.002
so that the actual influence of z is to improve the risk pool of insured individuals.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we provided an overview about commonly used testing procedures
for the detection of selection in insurance markets, focusing on their strengths and
weaknesses. We argued that, although the classical positive correlation test might
lead to incorrect conclusions about selection, it still has the advantage that it uses
cross-equation correlations of the residuals acquired at the individual level. Our
findings show that, just as two different sources of private information can offset the
correlation of the error in the approach of Chiappori and Salanie´ (Finkelstein and
McGarry, 2006), the inclusion of private information within an ‘unused characteris-
tics’ framework can lead to incorrect conclusions about the nature of selection if the
coefficients are heterogeneous concerning their association with both risk and insur-
ance status. This issue arises because the strategy of both Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) and Fang et al. (2008) use two separate equations for detecting selection.
To emphasize the potential problem of parameter heterogeneity we discuss, for-
mally, which circumstances can lead to false conclusions by allowing for the cor-
relation of coefficients across different equations. We demonstrate the relevance of
this finding with simulations by imposing different correlation structures between
an ‘unused characteristic’ z, insurance status and risk, and additionally allowing for
individual parameter heterogeneity that reflects different directions and degrees of
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selection. The results show that standard ‘unused characteristics’ approaches that
solely focus on the interpretation of single coefficients do not reveal this kind of
heterogeneity, i.e. a detected source of adverse selection may indeed be a source of
advantageous selection if the individual coefficients are negatively correlated. The
same phenomenon can obviously be found under certain correlation structures of the
parameters if advantageous selection or even no selection is detected.
In our empirical implementation, using the market of private health insurance in
England, we provided an example with the unused characteristic ‘availability of time’
which is not directly accessible by insurance companies. This variable may reflect
opportunity costs of waiting times in the health care sector, resulting in demand for
private health insurance. Our findings show that individual parameter heterogeneity
is a relevant issue in real markets as well. Although adverse selection within the
insurance market is empirically detected, this finding should not be interpreted as a
selection of high risks into the market, since the estimated parameters are strongly
negatively correlated due to the heterogeneous outcomes of our explanatory variable.
The estimated ‘mean’ coefficient of such variables can be driven by different parts
of the population and does not allow a meaningful interpretation concerning the
underlying direction of selection. When interpreting our empirical findings we have
to keep in mind that our aim is to focus on specific sources of selection, i.e. the total
degree of selection within the insurance market is beyond the scope of this study.
Since the relevance of parameter heterogeneity is an empirical question, and a
general conclusion for other markets and characteristics cannot be provided, we sug-
gest that this possibility should be tested if one wants to reveal a specific source of
selection in insurance markets. Our findings are important for analysing the effi-
ciency of insurance markets. They are of interest to both the insurance industry and
policy makers, and should be accounted for whenever outcomes of structural changes
of insurance policies or the insurance market design overall are to be predicted, based
on ‘unused variables’. We wish to emphasise that our analysis deals with selection
and that neither of the approaches discussed in this paper are used to reveal an
underlying data generating process from a causal perspective. Instead the regression
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approaches are used solely as descriptive tools. Our contribution is designed in the
same spirit, i.e. we do not say that one specific variable is causally related to two
different dependent variables. The important thing is that, if there is a correlation
between one explanatory variable and both risk and insurance status, the estimated
coefficients cannot necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of selection in insurance
markets in one way or the other.
Our findings are particularly relevant in the case of unused variables for which,
a priori, we cannot assume a specific relationship with either insurance or health
status. In this case, it is necessary to be very careful about potential parameter
heterogeneity because even random outcomes of such ‘unused characteristics’ may
be falsely interpreted as sources of selection in insurance markets and market inef-
ficiencies. Although we do not make any claim about implications for welfare, the
economic implications of our ideas should be taken into account in welfare analysis,
because they directly affect the interpretation of which kind of selection is being
identified in the market of interest.
Needless to say, our study has a number of limitations. With regard to our
empirical application, we assume that a subjective health-risk variable is a good
indicator for individual health status, but we do not know if it is also a good measure
for future health care utilization. Hence, we make the implicit assumption in our
analysis that people with a relatively low (or relatively high) self-assessed health
status are correlated with a higher (or lower) probability of making a claim in respect
of health insurance. Future research should evaluate whether the robustness of this
assumption can be supported when using objective data about health care utilization,
e.g. number of visits to the doctor or, even better, treatment costs.
We assume a specific correlation structure Cov(δi, βi) 6= 0 of the parameters
of an ‘unsused characteristic’ on both risk and insurance status, i.e. the parame-
ters are defined for each individual. However, one may also consider a correlation
Cov(δa, βa) 6= 0 on another level a that confounds the interpretation of the standard
‘unused characteristics’ approaches. If the variable defining groups is in itself an
‘unused observable’, it could be used to solve the issues with standard approaches
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– since they will lead to correct conclusions if applied within each subsample sepa-
rately. We believe that an interesting area for future research may be to allow for
heterogeneity in the association between an unused characteristic z and both R and
I on another level than the individual one.
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A1: Data description
Variable Description
PHI owner of private health insurance
HR 2 lowest health categories based on self assessed health
smoke now current smoker
smoke past past smoker
female women
age actual age of respondent
occupation retired, unemployed and categories from
National Statistics Socio-economic Classification
couple married or cohabit
children respondent has children
CHH1-6 Childhood health status: Excellent, very good, good, fair,
poor, varied a lot
1
A2: Estimates standard approaches
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Approach Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) Fang et al. (2008)
Dep. var. HR PHI PHI PHI
HR -0.040*** -0.042***
(0.005) (0.005)
time avail -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.021***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
female -0.036*** 0.014* 0.012* 0.012*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
age 0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
couple -0.073*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
children 0.031** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
unemployed 0.166*** -0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
managerial -0.173*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.041***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
intermediate -0.152*** 0.053** 0.050** 0.046**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
small employer -0.153*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
lower supervisory -0.093*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.060***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
semi-routine -0.101*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.041***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
smoke now 0.173*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.053***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
smoke past 0.052*** -0.013* -0.011 -0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
cons 0.238*** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.186***
(0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
N 31492 31492 31492 31492
Notes: All columns show coefficients from a Linear Probability Model. Columns 1a and b are
estimates from the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), whereas columns 2a/b reflect the
coefficients based on Fang et al. (2008). Regional dummies are included and standard errors are
clustered at the individual level; standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2
A3: Robustness checks
Spec. N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Finkelstein and McGarry Fang et al. RC-Model
Dependent variable HR PHI PHI PHI PHI HR PHI –
Parameter βˆ δˆ αˆ2 αˆ2 − γˆ2 γˆ3 E
(
βˆi
)
E
(
δˆi
)
E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
1–time 31,492 -0.070*** -0.018*** -0.040*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.056*** -0.018*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) [0.810] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
2–Probit 31,492 -0.070*** -0.015***
(0.007) (0.006)
3–other cutoff 31,492 -0.058*** -0.018*** -0.031*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.044*** -0.018*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) [0.876] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
4–obj. HR 25,104 -0.062*** -0.015** -0.011* 0.001 -0.015** -0.049*** -0.014** -0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) [0.908] (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001)
Notes: Each row reports results from one specification. The columns of each specification show results of unused characteristics
approaches. Estimates resulting in columns 1 to 5 are based on (Linear) Probability Models. Columns 1 and 2 are estimates
from the approach of Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) represented by the structural equations (3) and (4), whereas columns 3
to 5 reflect the estimates based on the structural equations (5) and (6) suggested by Fang et al. (2008). Coefficients of other
‘used characteristics’ are not shown above. An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification
in column 3) equals the coefficient of R after the inclusion of z into the model. Columns 6 to 7 show the coefficients from
a multilevel model where the explanatory variable ‘availability of time’ is supposed to have a random coefficient and the
effect of all other variables is supposed to be fixed. Column 8 contains E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
, the degree of selection associated with z.
Specification 2 shows marginal effects of a Probit model, based on specification 1. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level; standard errors in (), p-values in []. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
A4: Robustness checks 2
Spec. N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Finkelstein and McGarry Fang et al. RC-Model
Dependent variable HR PHI PHI PHI PHI HR PHI –
Parameter βˆ δˆ αˆ2 αˆ2 − γˆ2 γˆ3 E
(
βˆi
)
E
(
δˆi
)
E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
1–time 31040 -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.040*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.057*** -0.018*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) [0.813] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
2–+income 31040 -0.071*** -0.016*** -0.036*** 0.001 -0.019*** -0.057*** -0.017*** -0.002***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) [0.827] (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
Notes: The columns of each specification show results of unused characteristics approaches. Estimates resulting in columns
1 to 5 are based on Linear Probability Models. Columns 1 and 2 are estimates from the approach of Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) represented by the structural equations (3) and (4), whereas columns 3 to 5 reflect the estimates based on
the structural equations (5) and (6) suggested by Fang et al. (2008). Coefficients of variable ‘income’ are shown in the second
row of specification 2. An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification in column 3) equals
the coefficient of R after the inclusion of z into the model. Columns 6 to 7 show the coefficients from a multilevel model where
the explanatory variable ‘availability of time’ is supposed to have a random coefficient and the effect of all other variables is
supposed to be fixed. Column 8 contains E
(
βˆiδˆi
)
, the degree of selection associated with z. Standard errors clustered at
the individual level; standard errors in (), p-values in []. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3
